One of the most fascinating developments in the field of international law in recent decades has been the astonishing spread of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, i.e. norms or guidelines that expressly avoid imposing legal obligations on the parties concerned. From a philosophical point of view, this is quite enigmatic: how to explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding treaty? In this article, I would like to explain the explanatory memorandum of soft law from the point of view of practical reasons in the game. First, I analyze the idea of authoritarian consultation and suggest that when the authorities advise their alleged subjects, they pretend to give about the alleged reasons for taking action. I will explain what the presumed reasons are. The argument focuses on the analysis of the idea of authoritarian counsel, which indicates that when the authorities advise their alleged subjects, they claim to give the subject what I invoke as presumed reasons to act. I explain here what the presumptuous reasons are and what the reasons are, and I propose it as a model for the practical reasons that are at stake when soft law operates vertically, in the case of non-binding directives from international authorities. The soft horizontal law, normally in the form of international treaties, is also explained by the use of the idea of presumed motives, coupled with the relationships of mutual responsibility that these agreements constitute without exception. . .